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1 INTRODUCTION 
Board of directors as a concept has been quite distant for the author for it has not 
been covered in the bachelor level studies. Perhaps for that particular reason 
boards and their responsibilities started to be the main interest for the thesis pro-
ject. It is said that if something is forbidden it will most likely draw attention. Boards 
of directors are not by any means forbidden but they are surprisingly far away from 
students reach. Also the positions in boards seemed to be available, at least for the 
most parts, for the political and the business elite. Only option was to get ac-
quainted with the subject and to figure out whether the boards of directors had 
room for further research or not. The author found out the research potential of the 
boards and that the boards are unique constitutions in the business environment. 
After a while the focus of the thesis was found as well. 
The resource dependence theory (RDT) started to stand out from the literature as a 
refreshing viewpoint to study boards of directors. RDT views the concept of board 
of directors as provider of resources to the CEO, high executives and the organiza-
tion as a whole (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The other important aspect for examining 
the boards came along, the agency theory. The main focus in the agency theory is 
the relationship between the board incentives and the monitoring function (Fama, 
1980; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The boards of directors are responsible for monitoring 
the management and making sure they act in favor of the shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).          
This study is based on Amy Hillman’s work on RDT. In Hillman and Dalziel’s (2003) 
meta-analysis they combine two different paths of measuring boards of directors’ 
performance and efficiency: the agency theory and the monitoring function and 
RDT and the provision of resources function. This was the first time they were inte-
grated in a research on board of directors. These two functions (the monitoring 
function and the provision of resources function) are the key elements in this re-
search along with remuneration. Hillman and Dalziel introduce a new term in their 
study called board capital which they utilize when forming proposals on how differ-
ent elements around the topic affect each other.  
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Figure 1 Hillman’s (2003) integrated model of board functions, antecedents, and firm per-
formance. 
RDT is of interest to the author because its main purpose is to describe the perfor-
mance of boards of directors. Boards of directors’ performance can be measured 
and interpreted by using qualifications, experience, external linkages and other in-
formation of a board in question. The idea of understanding the business environ-
ment around boards of directors intrigues the author.  Based on the author’s own 
perception a member of board of directors is usually a male in his fifties or sixties, 
highly educated and a former CEO or high executive of a well-known corporation. 
However this research is not about answering why people with these qualifications 
tend to be elected to the boards but to figure out how these qualifications affect 
the performance of the board.   
This research on boards of directors examines the personal qualifications of a board 
and relates it to firm performance. RDT is the principal theory along with the agency 
theory used to study the boards selected by the author giving an insight to the pro-
vision of resources and the monitoring function. Chapters three and four discuss the 
details of the study more thoroughly along with the data of the two case companies 
and their boards.   
The case companies under examination, Cargotec and Konecranes are both Finnish. 
Both the companies originate from KONE, which makes the comparison between 
them interesting. Although Cargotec and Konecranes have their roots in KONE they 
are competitors in the industries where they operate. Their main businesses are 
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cargo handling and lifting. The following section will introduce the reader into the 
theory and the terminology of this thesis, based on which he/she is able to under-
stand and interpret the findings and results made by the author.  
2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Board of directors  
Monitoring and provision of resources are responsibilities of a board, however this 
chapter looks into the board of directors’ formation, composition, dependence and 
incentive planning. The author finds it also important to emphasize the legal bound-
aries that set the limitations for boards in public listed companies. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) was introduced in 2002 to set limitations for boards and their procedures. 
Moreover this act is an answer to misusage of power, inside information and rela-
tionships by boards of directors (PwC’s white paper on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and current proposals by NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ, 2003).  
Organizations comprise of different constitutions with each of them having a spe-
cific task to conduct. One of the most important constitutions of a for-profit organi-
zation is its board of directors. Board of directors is the authority between share-
holders and management of an organization. Management, and especially CEO, of 
an organization is responsible for day-to-day operations whereas board of directors 
make sure that the operations are run in order to fulfil the interests of shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
As mentioned, board of directors is one of many constitutions in a public listed com-
pany. Boards of directors themselves comprise of different subunits, committees 
(Haapanen, Lainema, Lehtinen & Lähdesmäki, 2002). Usually a board has two or 
three committees: audit committee, nomination committee and compensation 
committee. However, in practice, boards concentrate more than one task under 
one committee e.g. Cargotec has audit and risk management committee and nomi-
nation and compensation committee. Thus it has four tasks under two committees. 
This may enhance the efficiency of the board but on the other hand it may increase 
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the amount of meetings of the committees and therefore the workload of the 
members as well. Boards will comprise their committees depending on the objec-
tives, the size and the development stage of the company (Smith, Mitchell & Sum-
mer, 1985).  
It is important to bear in mind that even though this study focuses on monitoring 
and provision of resources functions, remuneration and their linkage to perfor-
mance, boards of directors have other tasks as well. Planning CEO succession 
(Pitcher, Chreim & Kisfalvi, 2000), evaluating and rewarding top managers (Conyon 
& Peck, 1998) and monitoring strategy implementation (Rindova, 1999) are con-
stantly on the agenda in boards meetings. The before mentioned tasks, in most 
parts, belong under the monitoring function but can be defined as fixed or “day-to-
day” operations of a board of directors.  
2.1.1 Board composition 
Board of directors is a crucial tool for the company to build its performance, to 
monitor the executive directors and to provide resources for the company (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003).  Furthermore board of directors is the link between the sharehold-
ers and the CEO, making sure that the executive directors act in favor of the com-
pany and its owners (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In order to understand why board of 
directors is so vital organ for an organization it is important to look into how boards 
are composed and managed. Furthermore it is important to take into account how 
the organization as a whole is developing and in which kind of development stage it 
is at the moment of board’s composition. The author will briefly introduce organiza-
tion life cycles and path dependence theories for they have proved (Hillman, Golden 
& Lynall, 2003) to have an effect on board composition and furthermore to perfor-
mance.  
According to Hillman, Golden & Lynall (2003) board composition is more or less 
about timing. At what point of organizational life cycle the board is formed defines 
much of the boards’ probabilities to succeed. There are four distinct stages of life 
7 
 
cycles according to Quinn and Cameron (1983): entrepreneurial stage (early innova-
tion, niche formation and creativity), collectivity stage (high cohesion and commit-
ment), formalization and control stage (stability and institutionalization) and elabo-
ration of structure stage (domain expansion and decentralization). The key idea be-
hind the organizational life cycle is that in various different points of these stages 
organizations have different opportunities and challenges concerning their business 
(e.g. Cameron & Whetten, 1981; Dodge & Robbins, 1992). In the entrepreneurial 
stage an organization’s board would be sales and innovation oriented while in the 
elaboration of structure stage boards’ competences would be knowledge in mer-
gers and acquisitions and in organizational structure for instance.  
Path dependence also refers to timing but more directly to characteristics of board 
of directors that is formed in an early-stage of the life cycle. The theory implies that 
the chosen characteristics in the early-stage are hard to change over time and that 
it has negative impact to the functioning of a board. Hillman et al. (2003) brought 
these theories together and proposed that organizations with boards formed in the 
stage of the life cycle they are currently in will outperform those with boards 
formed in other stages. 
Besides the life cycle and path dependence theories CEO and external financiers 
have an impact in board compositions as well. When an organization is without a 
board, its CEO has great impact on, along with external financiers, to what direction 
the organization will head towards. Thus it is fairly easy to conclude that the two 
above mentioned authorities/stakeholders will eventually decide the characteristic 
and final composition of the board (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). The question is 
which one of them possesses the dominant power over the other if either? And 
most importantly what does it cause if one of the stakeholders has power over the 
other? 
Which one of the stakeholders has power over the other greatly depends on organi-
zational environment and the roles of the two stakeholders. Hillman et al. (2003) 
use Finkelstein’s (1992) dimensions of power (structural, expert, ownership and 
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prestige) to demonstrate the stakeholders influence on board formation. Structural 
and ownership power depend on the level of involvement of the stakeholder while 
expert power is up to the knowledge about the industry, and the qualifications of 
the stakeholders. Even though qualifications are crucial for this particular research 
the author finds that prestige power has the most influence on board formation. 
Prestige power and social status of a stakeholder is what attracts talented board 
members. Moreover board seats are filled with members who at the time fulfil the 
requirements of the organizational environment but the environment is likely to 
change as the organization develops (Hillman et al. 2003). 
2.1.2 Board dependence 
Board dependence concerns the board members’ relationships to the host organiza-
tion. In other words whether they are affiliated with the organization directly, indi-
rectly or not at all. Because this research involves two organizations that are of 
Finnish origin, it is reasonable to introduce the boundaries set for board independ-
ence by Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2010 (FCGC). According to the code a 
director is not independent of the company, if 
a) the director has an employment relationship or service contract with 
the company; 
b) the director has had an employment relationship or service contract 
with the company in the last three years; 
c) the director receives from the company or from members of its opera-
tive management not insignificant remuneration for services or other 
advice not connected with the duties of the board, e.g. consulting as-
signments with the company; 
d) the director belongs to the operative management of another company, 
and the two companies have, or have had in the past year, a customer, 
supplier or cooperation relationship significant to the other company; 
e) the director belongs to the operative management of a company whose 
director is a member of the operative management of the first-men-
tioned company (interlocking control relationship); 
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f) the director is, or has been in the past three years, the auditor of the 
company, a partner or an employee of the present auditor, or the direc-
tor is a partner or an employee in an audit firm that has been the com-
pany's auditor in the past three years. 
A director is not independent of a significant shareholder, if 
g) the director exercises control in the company or the director is a board 
member or has a relationship such as referred to in sub-sections a) to b) 
above to a party who exercises control in the company; 
h) the director is a significant shareholder or a board member of a signifi-
cant shareholder of, or has a relationship such as referred to in sub-sec-
tions a) to b) above to a significant shareholder of the company. In this 
recommendation, a significant shareholder is defined as a shareholder 
who holds at least 10 % of all company shares or of the votes carried by 
all the shares or who has the right or obligation to purchase a corre-
sponding number of already issued shares. 
The FCGC’s limitations for board dependence match to those of the SOX’s, New 
York Stock Exchange’s, American Stock Exchange’s and NASDAQ’s combined. There 
might be minor differences in some nuances but the general picture is the same.  
The FCGC recommends that the majority of the board should be independent of the 
company and furthermore at least two out of this majority should be independent 
of the significant shareholders of the organization. Complying with these recom-
mendations supports the boards’ objectivity in the eyes of the investors and other 
external organizations and most importantly the boards’ ability to act in the inter-
ests of the organization and its shareholders.  
While it is recommended and partly regulated that boards should be independent 
there is little evidence supporting the assumption that dependent boards are bad 
for the organization. According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003) board dependence has 
negative effects on monitoring but a positive effect on the provision of resources. 
As dependent or insider boards may not be beneficial for monitoring they are better 
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at providing advice and counsel, legitimacy, channels for communicating infor-
mation between the firm and external organizations, and assistance in obtaining re-
sources or commitments from important elements outside the firm (Pfeffer & Sa-
lancik, 1978). Because dependent boards have established some kind of social rela-
tionship to the CEO or management in general it lowers the bar for them to use 
their external connections in favor of the company or to give personal guidance 
(Westphal, 1999). 
2.1.3 Board remuneration 
The scholars who study boards of directors (e.g. Fama, 1980; Zahra & Pierce, 1989; 
Pfeffer & Zalancik, 1978; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) usually end up trying to find a link-
age to firm performance. Thus finding the motivation for boards to perform better 
is a key element in their research process. Agency theorists (Fama, 1980; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) argue for a direct link between board incentives and monitoring 
and therefore firm performance. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) on the other hand as-
sert that the relationship between board incentives and both monitoring and the 
provision of resources is indirect, grounding their argument on Hunter and Hunter’s 
(1984) meta-analysis where ability is proved to be the single most important deter-
minant of task performance. This implies that no matter how big the incentive is, a 
person will not perform better if he/she is unskilled for the vacancy (e.g. Vroom, 
1964).  
Taken the latter into account neither the monitoring function nor the provision of 
resources function are complete without a properly adjusted remuneration system 
and skilled board members (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). When incentives are properly 
adjusted according to boards’ responsibilities, it strengthens monitoring and boards 
motivation to provide resources (Betty & Zajac, 1994; Zald, 1969).  
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Figure 2 PwC’s 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey’s findings. 
PwC’s Annual Corporate Directors Survey (2013) points out that only 4% of the re-
spondents think that compensation is the main motivator for them to sit in a board, 
the big picture is a sum of many concepts. For the author remuneration is a concept 
to look into more carefully. The author would argue that even though only 4% of 
the respondents think compensation is the most important motivation to sit in a 
board, there are a number of people who think it is the second, third or fourth most 
important reason. When looking incentives in the above mentioned perspective it 
starts to add significant weight to it.  
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
As a result of series of accounting and management sccandals revieled in major 
organizations the United States government passed a legislation called Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (PwC’s white paper on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2003). Sar-
banes-Oxley or the SOX is a code of conduct for boards of directors. It consists of 
legislation and proposals concerning boards’ independence, corporate governance, 
oversight of ethical conduct and compliance and reporting procedures for the pub-
lic. Besides these implications the SOX has put lots of effort in reforming audit com-
mittees and their responsibilities, after all it is in audit committees hands to oversee 
the accounting and financial reporting processes of an organization. The SOX §301 
states:  
A committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of di-
rectors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial 
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reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the 
issuer; and if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire 
board of directors of the issuer.  
SOX inspired many securities exchanges and associations such as Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), The American Stock Ex-
change (Amex) and The NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) to propose their own 
membership standards (PwC’s white paper on SOX, 2003). They are presented in a 
comparative manner by PwC in Appendix 1. These organizations along with SOX 
build up the standards for corporate governance and ultimately to board work. 
When influential organizations demand changes it creates huge collective pressure 
towards organizations operating under their supervision to take heading into the 
wanted direction. Let it be mentioned that the regulations set by SOX or the securi-
ties exchanges mentioned above do not rule out the law and legislation effective in 
a country the organization operates (Gorman, 2009). If e.g. a Finnish company listed 
in NYSE would have a conflict between SOX and the corporate governance legisla-
tion of Finland, the latter would apply.   
Audit committee has been given significant value in the process of reforming the 
corporate governance standards. When realizing the committees’ responsibilities as 
a supervisor of any financial activity in an organization it isn’t hard to figure out why 
the audit committee is the fundamental part of the SOX act. The act has two re-
quirements for audit committees, first is that its members have to be independent 
and second that one of the committee’s members has to be a “financial expert” 
(Gorman, 2009). These terms are quite vague as themselves therefore they need 
some clarification. Being independent of the organization is explained above in the 
board dependence section of this research. The recommendations of the FCGC 
mostly apply in the combination of the SOX, SEC, Amex, NYSE and NASDAQ recom-
mendations. The “financial expert” should be educated and experienced through 
high financial positions in order to understand the accounting principles and finan-
cial statements (SOX Section 407(b)). 
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 Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) is mostly based on Pfeffer and Salancik’s work 
on the subject. The publication of The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective in 1978 made the RDT widely known and is today the fun-
damental study and reference for further research. From today’s researchers Amy 
Hillman is considered to be the most groundbreaking with her study on integrating 
agency and resource dependence perspectives. 
According to Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) RDT is 
mostly used in research on board of directors, moreover the theory is supported 
more often than any other board perspectives. Despite the fact that RDT is much 
supported in practice, agency theory is more commonly used theory to study 
boards of directors (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). The fact that RDT is a specific 
tool for examining boards and that it has plenty of room for further research makes 
it a perfect theory to apply in this research. Most importantly according to empirical 
data it is a more successful tool for understanding boards (Hillman et al., 2009). 
According to Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) the primary role of a board of directors is to 
provide resources for the company, either in positive or negative effect. There are 
four types of resources provided by boards: advice and counsel, legitimacy, chan-
nels for communicating the information between the firm and the external organi-
zations, and assistance in obtaining resources or commitments from important ele-
ments outside the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These four elements are closely 
tied to the provision of resources and board capital. The connections are presented 
in the following sections of this thesis. 
2.3.1 Provision of resources 
One of boards of directors’ responsibilities is provision of resources. Pfeffer and Sa-
lancik (1978: 163) give a good introduction to the function:  
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When an organization appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individ-
ual will come to support the organization, will concern himself with its prob-
lems, will variably present it to others and will try to aid it. 
Presenting an organization to others is as important as presenting other organiza-
tions to the one where the member in question is holding position. In other words 
members sitting in boards have an expectation, according to RDT scholars, to use 
their own external linkages in favor of the company.   
Among the supporters of RDT the provision of resources is the most important per-
spective adopted by scholars (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Boyd, 1990; Hillman, 
Cannella & Paetzold, 2000). In general, resources can be “anything that could be 
thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). Provi-
sion of resources indicates what external experience, connections and other en-
hancements can a board member bring into a company. These connections might 
include previous work experience in the industry, executive level friendships, cur-
rent positions in other boards and all the human and social capital that the member 
possesses. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) refer to this human and social capital as board 
capital. This of course indicates the board and its members to be examined as one 
unit.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) propose four benefits the board can provide: advice and 
counsel, legitimacy and reputation, channels of communicating information be-
tween external organizations and the firm and preferential access to commitments 
or support from important elements outside the firm. From these benefits it is pos-
sible to conclude that first, boards are composed of members who bring specific 
knowledge and expertise to the firm. Second, the prestige of directors may enhance 
the value of the organization. Third, board capital can be a tool for providing up-to-
date information of the industry and to reduce environmental uncertainties. Fourth 
and final, a firm can increase its performance e.g. by having representatives of their 
customers or suppliers in their board of directors.  
How these connections, benefits and abilities are linked to performance? There are 
at least three key factors the resources help to reduce: dependency between the 
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organization and external contingencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), uncertainty for 
the firm (Pfeffer, 1972) and transaction costs (Williamson, 1984). With all the three 
factors fulfilled the firm will have good probabilities to survive (Singh, House & 
Tucker, 1986). 
2.3.2 Board capital  
The term board capital is introduced by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and they explain 
board capital to “consist of both human capital (experience, expertise, reputation) 
and relational capital (network of ties to other firms and external contingencies).” 
Resource dependence theorists have discussed about board capital before but in 
the terms of expertise, experience, knowledge, reputation and skills (Becker, 1964; 
Coleman, 1988). Hence Hillman and Dalziel (2003) have combined the antecedents 
into a concept that excludes the former inadequacies thereby making it a bit more 
universal. 
As the citation above shows board capital is a broad term consisting of personal 
abilities, the business community’s respect and general opinion, and external link-
ages. Taking the complexity into account Hillman and Dalziel (2003) assert that 
boards have heterogeneous board capital, thus they vary in their abilities to moni-
tor. When suggesting that boards are heterogeneous in their ability to monitor it 
also refers to the boards consisting of heterogeneous members each of which 
brings their own amount of “personal capital” to the board.  
Board capital is everything that the board possesses inside the boundaries of the 
definition, e.g. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) propose that if boards have experi-
ence of a particular situation (mergers and acquisitions for instance) which is going 
to face the firm, they will perform better, improve monitoring and ultimately im-
prove performance. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have discussed about four benefits 
of board capital. Later, the four benefits have been positively associated with board 
capital. First provision of advice and counsel (Westphal, 1999), second provision of 
legitimacy and reputation (Daily & Schwenk, 1996), third provision of channels of 
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communication and conduits of information between firm and external organiza-
tions (Hillman, Zardkoohi & Bierman, 1999) and fourth acquiring resources from ex-
ternal organizations (Zald 1969). Thus board capital has been positively associated 
with both the provision of resources and monitoring.  
 Agency theory 
It was pointed out earlier in the thesis that while RDT is much supported in practice, 
agency theory is more commonly used theory to study boards of directors (Hillman, 
Withers & Collins, 2009). More specifically it is a common theory to study the 
boards of directors and firm performance. The main focus of the agency theory in 
the current study is the relationship between the board incentives and the monitor-
ing function (Fama, 1980; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) where the boards of directors are 
responsible for monitoring the management and making sure they act in favor of 
the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
What the agency theory is all about? In agency theory, there are two distinct fac-
tors: principal and agent. To make it simple, the principal is e.g. a person who wants 
another person (the agent) to perform some activity or service on his/her behalf. 
Moreover the activity requires that the principle delegates some decision-making 
power to the agent. The principal expects the agent to perform the activity or ser-
vice in the best of his/her abilities and bearing in mind the interests of the principal. 
In order to stop the agent from pursuing his/her self-interests the principal needs to 
provide some incentives for the agent to act in favor of the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).   
The above example presents the theoretical underpinning of the agency theory. In 
business environment the principal is the owner and the agent is the CEO/top man-
agers. When a task is given to the agent, how can the principal make sure that the 
agent acts in favor of the principal? This question presents what the agency theo-
rists try to find out and where the board of directors is in a key role. In modern or-
ganizations the ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932) are in most of the 
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cases separated. This indicates that the owners are separated from the manage-
ment. The board of directors is the link between the shareholders (the principal) 
and the management (the agent). Therefore the agency theorists see the role of the 
boards of directors as monitors of the management in order to protect the share-
holder’s interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Monitoring 
Other equally important function as provision of resources for board of directors is 
to monitor the management on behalf of the shareholders. The term monitoring 
function is used by agency theorists (Boyd, 1990; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; 
Mace, 1971; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) who link a board’s ability 
to monitor to firm performance. It is argued that the better the monitoring the bet-
ter are the chances of the firm to succeed. While this sounds quite straight forward 
one needs to bear in mind that monitoring consists of different aspects.  
 
Figure 3 Monitoring function based on Hillman’s article on boards of directors and firm 
performance (2003). 
The need for monitoring derives from the separation of ownership and control in 
organizations’, where there, might arise potential conflicts of interests (Berle & 
Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Separation of ownership and control means 
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that decision management (initiation and implementation) is separated from con-
trol management (ratification and monitoring) creating two functions from which 
the former will be responsible for the decision making and the latter for the control-
ling and monitoring the consequences (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This proposition sug-
gests that managers may pursue their self-interests at the expense of shareholders 
and thus creating agency costs. Monitoring is what can reduce managers from pur-
suing their self-interest. Therefore according to the agency theorists’ the boards of 
directors need independent directors in order to enhance monitoring (Fama, 1980; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Today’s organizations prefer independent boards instead of dependent boards but 
what advantages do the dependent boards have compared to the independent 
ones? Boards with social ties to the CEO will increase the offering of advice and 
counsel (Westphal, 1999). Not only does the relationship to the CEO increase the of-
fering of advice and counsel but it also increases the frequency of the exchange of 
them. Westphal (1999) also states that when boards have such ties to CEO the di-
rectors feel more comfortable of helping people they know and that they have a 
feel of being obligated to provide assistance. To conclude, the dependent boards of 
directors have disincentive to monitor whereas they are generous of providing re-
sources.  
Assuming that other factors are in order, what gives the board of directors the moti-
vation to monitor? The agency theorists suggest that the primary antecedent for 
monitoring is the board incentives and when aligning the incentives with share-
holder’s interests the monitoring will improve and the effect on firm performance is 
positive (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency theorists also state that 
the boards vary in their abilities to monitor. Hillman & Dalziel (2003) point out that 
the basic assumption must be that boards of directors are heterogeneous in their 
ability to monitor. Each board is individual and therefore composed of individuals 
with unique qualifications. 
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3 CASE COMPANIES 
 Cargotec 
Cargotec is a leading provider of cargo handling solutions. It is a Finnish based com-
pany listed on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. They operate in more than 100 countries 
with sales totaling EUR 3.2 billion in 2013. Cargotec has divided its operations in 
three different business areas: maritime transportation and offshore industry, har-
bor and port distribution and on-road load handling services. Each of the three busi-
ness areas has a brand of its own to manage the operations. MacGregor is special-
ized in maritime transportation and offshore solutions for cargo handling, Kalmar 
provides cargo handling solutions and services to ports, terminals, distribution cen-
ters and heavy industry and Hiab provides on-road load handling equipment and 
services.1 
Today’s Cargotec is the result of a series of mergers and acquisitions between in-
dustry leaders in cargo and load handling business. The businesses within Cargotec 
have long histories during which their solid market positions have been built. 
Through strategic and sustainable growth, Cargotec has developed its current level 
of product and solutions know-how and customer relationships. Cargotec Corpora-
tion was formed in June 2005 when Kone Corporation demerged into two compa-
nies to be listed, Cargotec and KONE. After the demerger Kone Corporation’s busi-
nesses MacGregor, Kalmar and Hiab formed Cargotec. 
Board of directors 
The author refers the people sitting in Cargotec’s board of directors simply as 
“members of the board” or “member X, Y, Z etc.” if needed. This arrangement is jus-
tified for the sake of being discreet towards the board and the company, moreover 
names do not have any effect on the results presented in this thesis. Cargotec’s 
board of directors has consisted of seven (7) members for the examination period 
1 The information concerning Cargotec is retrieved from the company’s website (www.cargotec.com) 
and annual reports. These sources are trusted and valid, moreover they are the main source of infor-
mation for investors. 
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of 2011-2013. Let it be added that one woman has held a seat for the whole time. 
During 2011-2013 there has been only one change in the composition of the board. 
The 2013 annual general meeting selected new member to the board as a long time 
board member stepped aside. The board can be described active and committed ac-
cording to their attendance to board and committee meetings over the 2011-2013 
time period. There has been 7 non-attendances of the 79 times the board and com-
mittees have gathered. In approximately 91% of all the meetings, they have had full 
attendance.     
Table 1 Cargotec’s board member attendance to meetins in 2013  
 
The company assesses its dependence regularly and informs about it in annual re-
ports or through other publications if necessary. The following is going to be a re-
view of the board of directors’ dependence during the examination period. In order 
to avoid confusions and misunderstandings it is correct to use citations from annual 
reports actual dependence assessments starting from 2011 and ending up in 2013. 
According to the assessment conducted in March 2011, all members of the 
Board were independent of the company and, with the exception of member X 
and member Y, also independent of major shareholders. Member X, Chairman 
of the Board, is one of the largest owners of Cargotec through the company 
Wipunen varainhallinta Oy controlled by him, holding over 20 percent of the 
votes and over 10 percent of the shares of the company. He is also a Board 
member in two major shareholder companies, Mariatorp Oy and D-sijoitus Oy. 
Member Y is a Board member of Wipunen varainhallinta Oy and Mariatorp 
Oy. 
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According to the assessment conducted in March 2012, all members of the 
Board were independent of the company and, with the exception of member X 
and member Y, also independent of major shareholders. Member X, Chairman 
of the Board, is one of the largest owners of Cargotec through the company 
Wipunen varainhallinta Oy controlled by him, holding approximately 23 per-
cent of the votes and over 12 percent of the shares of the company. He is also 
a Board member in two major shareholder companies, Mariatorp Oy and D-
sijoitus Oy. Member Y is a Board member of Wipunen varainhallinta Oy and 
Mariatorp Oy. Member Z, who was appointed as interim President and CEO as 
of 8 October 2012, was dependent of the company during his position as CEO. 
During 2012 also member Q worked as a consultant for the company and was 
not independent of the company. 
According to the assessment conducted in March 2013, all members of the 
Board were independent of the company and, with the exception of member X 
and member Y, also independent of major shareholders. Member X, Chairman 
of the Board, is one of the largest owners of Cargotec through the company 
Wipunen varainhallinta oy controlled by him, holding over 23 percent of the 
votes and almost 13 percent of the shares of the company. He is also a Board 
member in two major shareholder companies, Mariatorp Oy and D-sijoitus Oy. 
Member Y is a Board member of Wipunen varainhallinta Oy and Mariatorp 
Oy. Member Z, who acted as Interim President and CEO until 28 February 
2013, was dependent on the company during his position as CEO. 
From the assessments it can be seen that the board operates inside the boundaries 
of Finish Corporate Governance Code 2010, with one exception. The exception con-
cerns member Z who at the same time acted as Interim President and CEO and as a 
member of nomination and compensation committee. This action departs from the 
FCGC recommendations 29 and 32 which state that managing director should not 
be a member of neither nomination nor compensation committee due to the na-
ture of matters they deal with. Members X and Y have been independent of the 
company but not of major shareholders. Finally member Q worked as a consultant 
for the company during 2012 and thus was dependent of the company. 
 Konecranes 
Konecranes describes itself as a world-leading group of lifting businesses. They 
serve a broad range of customers, including manufacturing and process industries, 
shipyards, ports and terminals. Konecranes provides productivity-enhancing lifting 
solutions as well as services for lifting equipment and machine tools of all makes. 
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The company splits is business in two main functions: equipment and service. 
Konecranes' business area equipment offers components, cranes and material han-
dling solutions whereas the service offers a full range of service solutions, special-
ized maintenance and modernization services for all types of industrial cranes, port 
equipment, and machine tools. In 2013 group sales totaled EUR 2.1 billion. 
Konecranes operates in 600 locations in 48 countries. Konecranes is listed on the 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki.2 
Konecranes’ history dates back to early 1900’s but it wasn’t until 1994 when 
Konecranes was formed. At the time KONE Corporation listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange disposing all of its non-elevator business related operations, including 
Konecranes. This was a strategic move to simplify KONE’s structure and governance. 
Two years after that in 1996 Konecranes took a step forward as it listed on the Hel-
sinki Stock Exchange. After listing into stock markets Konecranes has made several 
acquisitions in order to grow its business but moreover to receive crucial technolog-
ical advantage and foothold in new markets. 
Board of directors 
The author refers the people sitting in Konecranes’ board of directors simply as 
“members of the board” or “member X, Y, Z etc.” if needed. This arrangement is jus-
tified for the sake of being discreet towards the board and the company, moreover 
names do not have any effect on the results presented in this thesis. Konecranes’ 
board of directors has consisted of 8 members the whole examination period of 
2011-2013. During that time two of those members have been women. The board 
has experienced two changes in its composition in the given time frame, one in 
2011 and the other in 2012. The average attendance in board meetings (excluding 
2 The information concerning Konecranes is retrieved from the company’s website 
(www.konecranes.com) and annual reports. These sources are trusted and valid, moreover they are 
the main source of information for investors. 
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committee meetings) during the three years has been 97.7 %. According to the at-
tendance it can be concluded that the board is active and committed to its responsi-
bilities.   
Table 2 Konecranes’ board member attendace to meetings in 2013 
 
The company assesses its dependence regularly and informs about it in annual re-
ports or through other publications if necessary. The following is going to be a re-
view of the board of directors’ dependence during the examination period. In order 
to avoid confusions and misunderstandings it is correct to use citations from annual 
reports actual dependence assessments starting from 2011 and ending up in 2013. 
All other members elected to Konecranes’ Board of Directors, except member 
A, are deemed independent of the company. Member A is deemed dependent 
of the company based on the Board’s overall evaluation relating to his former 
and current positions in Konecranes, combined with his substantial voting 
rights in the company. All Board members are independent of the company’s 
significant shareholders. 
All other members elected to Konecranes’ Board of Directors, except member 
A, are deemed independent of the company. Member A is deemed dependent 
of the company based on the Board’s overall evaluation relating to his former 
and current positions in Konecranes, combined with his substantial voting 
rights in the company. All other Board members are independent of the com-
pany’s major shareholders except member B, who is deemed to be dependent 
on major company shareholders based on his current position as the Manag-
ing Director of Hartwall Capital Oy Ab. HTT KCR Holding Oy Ab holds more 
than 10 percent of Konecranes Plc’s shares and votes. HTT KCR Holding Oy Ab 
is a subsidiary of Hartwall capital Oy Ab. 
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All other members elected to Konecranes’ Board of Directors, except member 
A, are deemed independent of the company. Member A is deemed dependent 
of the company based on the Board’s overall evaluation relating to his former 
and current positions in Konecranes, combined with his substantial voting 
rights in the company. All other Board members are independent of the com-
pany’s major shareholders except member B, who is deemed to be dependent 
on major company shareholders based on his current position as the Manag-
ing Director of Hartwall Capital Oy Ab. HTT KCR Holding Oy Ab holds more 
than 10 percent of Konecranes Plc’s shares and votes. HTT KCR Holding Oy Ab 
is a subsidiary of Hartwall capital Oy Ab. 
As it is mentioned in the assessments, member A is defined to be dependent on the 
company because of his former and current positions in the company combined 
with his substantial voting rights. All other members are independent of the com-
pany and its significant shareholders except for member B, who is deemed to be de-
pendent of the company’s significant shareholders based on his current position as 
a Managing Director of Hartwall Capital Oy Ab. A subsidiary of Hartwall Capital Oy 
Ab holds more than 10 % of Konecranes’ shares and votes. Other than that the 
board operates inside the boundaries of Finish Corporate Governance Code 2010.   
 Financial information of the case companies 
Even though the case companies and their boards have been introduced separately 
it is important that their key financial figures are presented in a comparative man-
ner.  
Table 3 Key financial figures of the case companies. 
CARGOTEC KONECRANES 
 
PAT Total sales revenue EBIT 
Market capi-
talization PAT 
Total sales 
revenue EBIT 
Market cap-
italization 
2013 
55.4 MEUR 3,181 MEUR 92.5 MEUR 1,742 MEUR 49.4 MEUR 2,099 MEUR 84.5 MEUR 1,489 MEUR 
2012 
89.5 MEUR 3,327 MEUR 131.4 MEUR 1,034 MEUR 84.8 MEUR 2,171 MEUR 
132.5 
MEUR 1,472 MEUR 
2011 
149.3 MEUR 3,139 MEUR 207.0 MEUR 1,410 MEUR 64.9 MEUR 1,896 MEUR 
106.8 
MEUR 803 MEUR 
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Looking at the total sales revenues Cargotec is the bigger company by one billion 
euros. However the companies are approximately the same size according to the 
general perception of market capitalization or market cap. Organizations are di-
vided into groups based on their market cap: large-cap organizations (10 billion USD 
and above), mid-cap (2-10 billion USD) and small-cap (300 million USD-2 billion 
USD). The 2013 market caps for Cargotec and Konecranes are 2,182 MUSD and 
1,865 MUSD respectively. With these values Cargotec would go to the mid-cap cate-
gory and Konecranes to the small-cap category even though they are pretty much 
the same size. 
Both of the companies are making profits but the trend seems to be decreasing. 
Cargotec has had approximately the same total sales revenues for the three year ex-
amination period but the profits have dropped 62.9 % from 2011 to 2013. 
Konecranes has had ups and downs in its profits over the three year examination 
period while the sales revenues have stayed the same or slightly risen. Konecranes 
made their best result in 2012 by making 3.9 % profit out of the total sales reve-
nues. On the other hand Konecranes’ profits have decreased 23.9 % from its 2011 
starting over the three years. 
4 METHODOLOGY 
 Research questions and objectives 
In order to familiarize the reader with the research problem and questions derived 
from the theory, the methodological preferences and with the steps that this re-
search took, this chapter introduces the process in more detail (Kananen 2011, 12). 
At its best, it enables someone to repeat or replicate the research in the future, and 
it gains reliability and validity for the present research (Kananen 2011, 79-83). Fur-
thermore in this chapter the author introduces the research questions and defines 
the objectives of this research. The specified research questions are leading the way 
26 
 
to find the best possible strategy to collect the data that would generate the an-
swers to the questions. It will eventually show whether the research generates the 
wanted information or not (Kananen 2011, 24.). 
The theoretical framework that was introduced before generates the material from 
which the research questions are formed. By answering to those questions the au-
thor can generate the needed information for further analysis (Kananen 2011, 12). 
The current study takes a closer look at the relationship between the boards of di-
rectors and firm performance in a specific industry and by using two case compa-
nies. The research problem is to find out how the experience, the qualifications, the 
external linkages and the remuneration of boards of directors of the case compa-
nies affect the firm performance. The research questions below try to outline the 
research problem in a holistic manner in order to get the best possible results by an-
swering to them. 
• What are the main differences of the boards of directors of Konecranes and 
Cargotec? 
• How do the different factors (experience, qualifications, external linkages 
and remuneration) affect each other? 
• How are the four factors connected to firm performance? 
• What role does the board capital play in the boards of the case companies? 
• What are the connections of the four factors to the monitoring and the pro-
vision of resources functions? 
Based on the research problem and the research questions the objective of the re-
search is to get a holistic understanding of how the board incentives moderate the 
monitoring function and the provision of resources function and how does the 
board capital affect these connections. 
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 Research design – Research methods and strategy 
For the research to be valid and having a chance to form reliable results one has to 
choose an appropriate approach for a research. Moreover choosing the right ap-
proach for a research enables one to adopt proper data collection methods, provide 
understanding about where to gather data from and how to analyze it. In addition, 
knowledge from different types of research approaches gives better understanding 
on determining which approach is the most suitable for a certain case. (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill 2009, 126.) 
Business research can be conducted either by qualitative or quantitative methodol-
ogies. Rather than pointing out what these terms stand for individually, they should 
be looked at what they consist of (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 3-4). According to 
Silverman (2001) qualitative and quantitative methodologies have a lot of internal 
variety and therefore should not be compared to each other without proper under-
standing of them.   
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) describe qualitative methodologies understanding 
based, interpretive and aiming for a holistic view of the research while quantitative 
methodologies are more structured and standardized for interpreting the collected 
data. Among business researchers qualitative research has been in the shadow of 
quantitative research because it has been seen as a complementary methodology 
when statistics need some meat over their bones (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). 
Even though these two methods are defined by comparison they can be used in 
harmonious way if a study in question demands it. The essential thing is to recog-
nize what practice or combination meats the standards of the particular research. 
The current research is done by using both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. By aiming to produce information on a specific case and by trying to un-
derstand the reasons why people with certain qualities and abilities are elected to 
boards of directors, this can be qualified as qualitative research. On the other hand 
it is necessary to provide numerical, hard data out of the boards and by that defini-
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tion this a quantitative research as well. First the author seeks information concern-
ing the RDT, the agency theory, board of directors in general and finally the case 
companies’ boards of directors. In this phase the author uses secondary data in or-
der to form the theoretical base of the thesis. The information concerning the case 
companies’ boards of directors is also secondary data because someone else has 
gathered that data into e.g. annual reports. The author just construes the right in-
formation into right places. In this sense the primary data are the findings from 
where the author makes his own assumptions and propositions.  
 Data collection and implementation  
After the research methods and strategy have been introduced, the research will 
proceed to data collection and implementation. The author carefully poses a strat-
egy to collect useful empirical data. When the data gathering is properly planned 
and conducted it enables the author to have the best available data at hand and 
hopefully to answer into the research question(s). In order to gather the right em-
pirical data, two kinds of sources can be distinguished: primary and secondary data. 
Secondary data is collected by others and can be gathered to other purposes, but 
can be used for the author’s research purposes. Primary data is collected by the au-
thor and the purpose is to answer the research question at hand (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug 2002, 27; 47; 76). 
Before collecting the primary data, secondary sources should be thoroughly looked 
into. Secondary data can help in answering the research questions or solve the re-
search problem. In addition, secondary data can support in problem formulation 
and creating research questions (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2002, 76-78). 
As the case companies have been introduced earlier in the research the logical step 
forward is to take a look how the data was collected and how it can be measured. 
These two companies are both major players in the industry and they are both 
listed in Helsinki stock exchange. Because they are listed companies it gives the au-
thor an advantage of retrieving the needed data from the companies’ annual re-
ports which are public information therefore accessible for all. 
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In the current study the author has gathered the primary data out of the secondary 
data. This means that from the public information the author has brought together 
the needed information, formed basic assumptions, measured it, compared it with 
proxies and has come up with proposals. The proposals are the primary data from 
where the author starts to interpret and make conclusions of. 
All the data used in this research was gathered from the websites and annual re-
ports (2011-2013) of Cargotec and Konecranes. Because the companies are both 
public listed companies all the investor information is accessible through their web-
sites. The primary objective for this research was to find out how the qualifications, 
experience, external linkages and remuneration of the boards of directors affect the 
firm performance. For the qualifications the author used the board members’ de-
grees of education and changed the different degrees into a more measurable units. 
The setup is as follows:  
a) 0 = No degree 
b) 1 = Bachelor’s degree 
c) 2 = Master’s degree 
d) 3 = Licentiate’s degree 
e) 4 = Doctoral degree 
f) 5 = Professor’s degree (or above) 
If a person had more than one degree, they were measured by the highest degree 
achieved. If e.g. a member of a board has a master’s degree in engineering and a 
bachelor’s degree in economics, the value given to the member’s qualification 
would be 2 according to the list above. By using numerical values which represent 
different levels of educational degrees it is possible to calculate e.g. averages and 
medians for a relevant comparison of the boards.   
Experience is measured by work experience in years. The assumption here is that 
one’s work experience starts accumulating at the age of 25 after finished studies, 
army etc. The formula for calculating the experience is Age – 25 = Experience. For a 
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65 year old person the experience would be 65 – 25 = 40. The reason why the au-
thor chose the age of 25 as a zero point for the experience is because it appeared to 
be reasonable. This assumption is based on the authors own empirical experience 
of the average age of graduation from different universities. The fact that the zero 
point is the same for the whole set of board members is crucial for producing sali-
ent results. In a case where the board of directors have not had any changes in their 
composition, the experience years are summed up in order to calculate the median 
values for descriptive statistics. However if there has been changes in the composi-
tion, then the experience years of the leaving board member and the joining board 
member have been averaged.   
External linkages are also measured in numbers. The amount of linkages is based on 
the information of the board members given in the case companies’ annual reports. 
The linkages mentioned in the annual reports may not include the whole list of ex-
ternal linkages of a board member, even though it is the most trusted list at hand. 
Thus it is used in this research. The external linkages include previous and current 
work history, board memberships and positions in other organizations. The number 
of linkages are revised annually in case of new linkages should come up.   
The information on remuneration is retrieved from the remuneration statements 
which are part of annual reports. One of the interesting parts of remuneration is 
what proportion of the total remuneration consists of fixed and performance based 
income. The remuneration figures of the companies are presented at board level 
and at individual level. The figures have been summed up, averaged and compared 
to one another depending on the use of the information. Year-to-year improvement 
is also monitored and analyzed, between the companies and separately. 
The positivist goal of this study is to represent how the performance of the two case 
companies from the same industry is measured by examining the different factors 
of the members of their boards. Sample size is fairly low but what the author wants 
to point out is, the smaller the size the better are the probabilities of understanding 
a specific case. More general point of view would need bigger sample from across 
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different industries. In that case the amount of data would grow too big to handle 
for a bachelor’s level research. The current subject provides more than enough for a 
single research. However the selected sample size and the simplified model of ex-
amining the board performance leaves room for future research.  
 Research ethics 
Research ethics can be fundamentally explained as the difference between ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’. Ethical principles give guidelines for the researcher about what can be 
considered a good scientific practice and what is considered unethical and harmful 
action from the perspective of scientific communities. Institutions often establish 
their own set of principles in order to ensure high ethical and scientific standards. 
Some ethical principles are universally accepted, but some ethical issues are more 
complex. Nevertheless, some general key elements in ethical guidelines can be 
highlighted, such as the protection of participants or case companies in the research 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008 65; 70). 
Researchers have moral obligation to inform readers about reliability and credibility 
of the research, and raise reader’s awareness about underlying uncertainties and 
complexities. The purpose of the research should not cause embarrassment or any 
other disadvantages for the interviewees, organizations or other constitution under 
examination. Participants should be informed about the real purpose of the re-
search and therefore enable them to participate on a voluntary basis and give in-
formed consent. Participants should be informed about usage of the technology if 
e.g. the interviews are recorded, and preserving participant’s anonymity and confi-
dentiality should be assured. In addition, participants should be aware of how the 
collected data will be used. In writing process, the researcher must evaluate if there 
is enough evidence to draw the conclusions and what are possible bias of the re-
searcher. Plagiarism can be avoided by using citations and references. The re-
searcher should give acknowledgement to other researchers and their work, and 
not obtain credit for other people’s ideas (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2002, 18-20; Eriksson 
& Kovalainen 2008, 70-75).  
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According to Eriksson & Kovalainen, credibility of the research have linkage to fol-
lowing the ethical rules, and therefore the researcher should get familiar with them 
before starting the research process. Often research ethics is linked to interviews 
and data-collection process. However, research ethics should be present in actual 
research process from the beginning to the end. This contains starting the relation-
ship between the researcher and the researched and ending to the phase where the 
report is published (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 64-65). 
5 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This part of the current study provides the key findings of the case companies’ 
boards of directors. Most of the findings are presented in the form of tables and fig-
ures in order to give a visual overall picture of the subject in question. The findings 
are presented in a logical order. Below of each of the tables and figures there is a 
discussion part or interpretation of the findings. After every discussion part there is 
a short conclusion of the findings and at the end of this chapter all the key issues 
are constructed into a conclusion paragraph. By organizing the information into 
smaller units the reader can process the presented information while going for-
ward. Moreover the reader can organize his/her thoughts after every part. 
By the findings and discussion the author aims to answer to the research questions 
that were presented in the methodology chapter. The answers to the research 
questions should comprehensively describe the research problem if the questions 
are properly constructed and if the findings are relevant. 
 Board experience 
At this point it is relevant to recall that the experience is measured in years and that 
it starts to accumulate after the board member has turned 25. In the following table 
the case companies’ boards of director’s experiences are presented one year at a 
time starting from 2011. If there is some additional information in the tables it is 
visibly marked and explained in the footnote. 
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Table 4 Boards experience comparison between Cargotec and Konecranes 2011. 
CARGOTEC Board 
of directors 2011 Experience 
KONECRANES 
Board of directors 
2011 Experience 
Member 1 28 Member 1 43 
Member 2 34 Member 2 31 
Member 3 23 Member 3 32 
Member 4 28 Member 4 41 
Member 5 42 Member 5 43 
Member 6 33 Member 63 27 
Member 7 27 Member 74 22 
    Member 8 19 
    Member 9 31 
Median  28 Median 31,5 
First of all the boards have different amount of members. However the amount of 
members does not affect the findings because the median value is what we are 
looking for and it is not dependent on the number of samples. Median is the value 
that separates the higher half of the sample from the lower half. Median values for 
the case companies are as follows: Cargotec 28 and Konecranes 31.5. According to 
the median values, the board of directors of Konecranes is more experienced than 
the board of Cargotec by 3.5 years. Even though there seems to be less fluctuation 
in the Cargotec’s figures if looking the high and the low values, the experience years 
all together are lower than the corresponding figures of Konecranes.   
There is no radical assumptions to be made based on one year’s comparison. On the 
other hand experience is a crucial part of Hillman and Dalziel’s (2003) proposition 
on board capital. They assert that board capital is positively associated with the pro-
vision of resources, which in turn is positively associated with firm performance. In 
other words board capital is indirectly linked to firm performance. The experience 
3 Member 6 joined to the Konecranes’ board of directors after the election was held in Annual General 
Meeting 31st of March 2011. 
4 Member 7 left his position at the board of Konecranes 31st of March 2011 due to change in composi-
tion of the board. 
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data itself is not enough to propose any significant results, it needs the qualifica-
tions, external linkages, remuneration findings and key financial figures from both 
the case companies in order to make conclusions. 
Table 5 Boards experience comparison between Cargotec and Konecranes 2012. 
CARGOTEC Board 
of directors 2012 Experience 
KONECRANES 
Board of directors 
2012 Experience  
Member 1 29 Member 1 43 
Member 2 35 Member 2 32 
Member 3 24 Member 35 38 
Member 4 29 Member 46 33 
Member 5 43 Member 5 42 
Member 6 34 Member 6 44 
Member 7 28 Member 7 28 
    Member 8 20 
    Member 9 32 
Median 29 Median  33,75 
Cargotec’s median experience has raised from 28 to 29 years due to the annual gain 
of the experience years and the fact that there has been no changes in the composi-
tion of their board of directors. Konecranes on the other hand have gained the ex-
perience in the form of annual gain but more importantly because of new, more ex-
perienced, member has joined the board of directors. Because of this Konecranes is 
now 4.75 years ahead of Cargotec in the terms of experience.   
5 Member 3 joined to the Konecranes’ board of directors after the election was held in the Annual 
General Meeting 22nd of March 2012. 
6 Member 4 left his position at the board of directors of Konecranes 22nd of March 2012 due to the 
change in the composition of the board. 
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Table 6 Boards experience comparison between Cargotec and Konecranes 2013. 
CARGOTEC Board 
of directors 2013 Experience 
KONECRANES 
Board of directors 
2013 Experience 
Member 1 30 Member 1 44 
Member 2 36 Member 2 33 
Member 37 38 Member 3 39 
Member 48 25 Member 4 43 
Member 5 30 Member 5 45 
Member 6 44 Member 6 29 
Member 7 35 Member 7 21 
Member 8 29 Member 8 33 
Median 31,5 Median 36 
Couple of things to remember when looking at the medians from 2013. First, the 
median for Konecranes has raised more than the annual gain of the experience 
years (2.25 instead of 1) because in the year 2012 the joining member’s higher (38) 
experience was averaged with the leaving member’s lower (33) experience. There-
fore in 2013 the experience of the joined member weighs more in the median 
value. Second, the median for Cargotec, as well, has raised more than the annual 
gain of the experience years (2.5 instead of 1), however the actual gain would be 
seen in the values of 2014 if no other changes should happen. It is the same situa-
tion that Konecranes had year before when the joining member’s high experience 
loses its edge to leaving member’s low experience.   
Over the three year examination period Konecranes has had more experienced 
board of directors of the two case companies. Three year median averages are 29.5 
(Cargotec) and 33.75 (Konecranes). Therefore the board of Konecranes has 12.5 % 
higher median average and 22 % higher annual gain of the experience years than 
the board of Cargotec. These figures show that Konecranes has increased its board 
capital by acquiring more experience in their board of directors. If it is assumed that 
increasing board capital with the experience years is the goal, then Cargotec would 
be more satisfied to their board composition than Konecranes. In many occasions, 
7 Member 3 joined to the Cargotec’s board of directors after the election was held in the Annual Gen-
eral Meeting 20th of March 2013. 
8 Member 4 left his position at the board of directors of Cargotec 20th of March 2013 due to the 
change in the composition of the board. 
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with the experience comes the prestige. Business community’s respect towards a 
board of directors can increase its value and worth (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). How-
ever, the examination of the other factors is crucial in order to form a general pic-
ture of the progress of the case companies.  
 Board qualifications 
In the introduction chapter the author presented an assumption (based on own em-
pirical experiences) that board members are highly educated men in their late fifties 
or sixties and former CEO’s or high executives of well-known corporations. This 
chapter will give an answer to the “highly educated” part of the assumption. The 
answer, of course, presents a narrow proportion of the board of directors as a con-
stitution, whether the findings are significant or not.  
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Table 7 Boards’ qualifications comparison between Cargotec and Konecranes. 
CARGOTEC Board of 
directors 2013 
Qualifica-
tions 
KONECRANES Board 
of directors 2013 
Qualifica-
tions 
Member 1 4 Member 1 4 
Member 2 2 Member 2 1 
Member 39 2 Member 3 2 
Member 410 3 Member 4 3 
Member 5 2 Member 5 2 
Member 6 3 Member 6 3 
Member 7 2 Member 7 2 
Member 8 2 Member 8 2 
MEDIAN  2 MEDIAN 2 
2012       
Member 1 4 Member 1 4 
Member 2 2 Member 2 1 
Member 3 3 Member 311 2 
Member 4 2 Member 412 1 
Member 5 3 Member 5 3 
Member 6 2 Member 6 2 
Member 7 2 Member 7 3 
    Member 8 2 
    Member 9 2 
MEDIAN 2 MEDIAN 2 
2011       
Member 1 4 Member 1 4 
Member 2 2 Member 2 1 
Member 3 3 Member 3 1 
Member 4 2 Member 4 3 
Member 5 3 Member 5 2 
Member 6 2 Member 613 3 
Member 7 2 Member 714 2 
    Member 8 2 
    Member 9 2 
MEDIAN 2 MEDIAN 2 
The qualifications or educational degrees during the examination period vary from 
bachelor’s degree (numerical value 1) to doctoral degree (numerical value 4). It can 
9 Member 3 joined to the Cargotec’s board of directors after the election was held in the Annual Gen-
eral Meeting 20th of March 2013. 
10 Member 4 left his position at the board of directors of Cargotec 20th of March 2013 due to the 
change in the composition of the board. 
11 Member 3 joined to the Konecranes’ board of directors after the election was held in the Annual 
General Meeting 22nd of March 2012. 
12 Member 4 left his position at the board of directors of Konecranes 22nd of March 2012 due to the 
change in the composition of the board. 
13 Member 6 joined to the Konecranes’ board of directors after the election was held in Annual Gen-
eral Meeting 31st of March 2011. 
14 Member 7 left his position at the board of Konecranes 31st of March 2011 due to change in compo-
sition of the board. 
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be said that the variation of the qualifications is rather high because the overall 
scale is from 0 to 5. However there are no differences in the medians between the 
companies. The median value for both of the companies is 2 in every year of the ex-
amination period. Even the calculations of difference between two means did not 
show that there is any significant difference between the case companies’ qualifica-
tions. 
 According to the findings the median qualification for both case companies is the 
educational level equivalent to the master’s degree. It is interesting to know that in 
order to get into a position as high as board member in a public listed company, one 
does not necessarily need a higher educational level than the master’s degree (if 
looking only the qualifications factor). This does not mean that a person with a mas-
ter’s degree would automatically end up being a member of board of directors in 
his/her career. Especially in Finland the business elite is quite small and some might 
argue that for an “outsider” it is rather hard to penetrate into the community. It is a 
sum of many factors to succeed and to keep on outperforming the others. The same 
mentality applies to firm performance as well. 
 Board’s external linkages 
Because the qualifications analysis provided quite little information, excluding the 
median level of education, it is logical to go forward and start to take a look at the 
external linkages of the boards. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the external link-
ages were measured by the number of connections to other organizations. In addi-
tion these linkages were retrieved from the annual reports of the case companies. 
The main findings are presented in the below figure. 
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Figure 4 The external linkages of the case companies’ boards of directors. 
The figure clearly presents that throughout the examination period the Cargotec’s 
board of directors has more external linkages than the Konecranes’ board. Cargo-
tec’s board averages its linkages to 69 while the Konecranes average is approxi-
mately 58. It must be noted that Cargotec has one (1) member less in their board of 
directors than Konecranes. Furthermore Cargotec has lower experience level in its 
board compared to Konecranes. Based on that it seems that the board experience 
does not increase the amount of external linkages. Even the amount of board mem-
bers does not seem to have major effect on the external linkages. How can it be 
possible that a board of directors with less experience and less members has higher 
average in the external linkages?  
Based on the findings the focus turns to Hillman and Dalziel’s (2003) definition of 
board capital, which combines both human and relational capital. The board which 
possesses more board capital is more likely to have valuable external linkages which 
in turn affects positively to firm performance. In order to figure out whether the ex-
ternal linkages are valuable or not one has to look at the overall firm performance. 
After the board remuneration findings, all the presented factors (experience, quali-
fications, external linkages and remuneration) are combined in order to test if there 
is linkage to firm performance. 
There might be many other reasons that are not examined in this study e.g. history 
of employment and networking skills. The history of employment is an important 
2011 2012 2013 Average
64 64
79
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54 54
65
58
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factor affecting the amount of external linkages. The information of how many em-
ployments one has had, where one has worked, for how long, in which positions 
and with what results is essential for understanding the formation of external link-
ages. Also the networking skills which can be assimilated with social skills deter-
mines how probable it is for a person to network. However the current study relies 
on its methods and the presented findings, out of which the author suggests propo-
sitions and makes conclusions. At the end of the thesis the author goes through the 
inadequacies the study may have and suggestions for further research.  
 Board remuneration 
Final factor before concluding the findings chapter is board remuneration. Both the 
agency and the resource dependence theorists see the board incentives as im-
portant tool for improving firm performance. The agency theorists argue that 
properly adjusted incentive system will improve the monitoring and thus perfor-
mance as well (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling), whereas the resource dependence 
theorists assert that the provision resources directly affects the firm performance 
(Pfeffer & Salancik; Williamson, 1984; Singh, House & Tucker, 1986). The remunera-
tion findings give fundamental value for the conclusion where all the findings are 
implemented into the theory base. 
 
Figure 5 Total remuneration of the case companies’ boards of directors. 
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The total remuneration of Cargotec’s board of directors is steadily growing through 
the examination period starting from 395 TEUR and topping at 412 TEUR. 
Konecranes’ total remuneration figures have a different kind of curve, first it is tak-
ing a big leap upwards in 2012 but in 2013 it is already decreasing. The total remu-
neration of the Konecranes’ board is on average approximately 7 % higher than its 
competitors. There is logical explanation for this 7 % gap, Konecranes has eight 
members in its board of directors while Cargotec has seven. This gap will most likely 
turn in the favor of Cargotec as the values are presented per person. In order to the 
figures to be comparable they need to be examined by the averages/board mem-
ber. 
 
Figure 6 Case companies’ average total remuneration/board member. 
The averages per board member show that a board member of Cargotec has bigger 
incomes than their counterparts’ in Konecranes. As the author predicted in the par-
agraph before Konecranes’ 7 % lead in incomes turned into a 5.7 % “loss”. The aver-
ages per board member follow the same curves as the total remuneration figures. 
The biggest differences between the boards appear when examining how the remu-
neration is comprised. On average 15.8 % of Cargotec’s board remuneration is 
based on performance and the rest 84.2 % is fixed income. Konecranes’ perfor-
mance based remuneration is 10.2 % of the total remuneration. Thus it is 56 % 
smaller, on average, than its competitors. The lower amount of performance based 
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income may affect negatively to firm performance because the boards of directors 
need incentives in order to be effective monitors and providers of resources.      
Cargotec’s board compensation seems to be better organized and planned because 
there is no remarkable gaps or fluctuations. It is growing firmly and steadily. 
Konecranes’ board compensation on the other hand seems to be more vulnerable 
to organizational change. Even though the author described Cargotec’s remunera-
tion better planned and organized, it is relevant to ask why the remuneration of the 
board is growing instead of staying the same. Is the board work becoming more 
challenging and time consuming? If Cargotec’s board remuneration is dependent on 
the growing workload then is the Konecranes’ board remuneration dependent on 
e.g. firm performance? 
 Conclusions 
After looking each of the factors individually it is time to combine the findings and 
link them into firm performance. What similarities do the different factors have? 
First of all the board qualifications seem to be aligned between the case companies. 
Both of the companies’ median educational level has stayed the same for the three 
year examination period, moreover there was no significant difference to be found. 
This indicates that for the qualifications part the boards are equal. Based on the 
findings the board qualifications is a stable factor and it stays constant. Other fac-
tors, however have shown rather mixed results. 
In order to make any further assumptions or conclusion it is crucial to take a look at 
the case companies’ performance over the three year examination period. The av-
erage profit after tax (PAT) is approximately the same for both companies, however 
the average does not tell the whole truth. In the chart below one pattern is clearly 
visible. While the Konecranes’ PAT figures are in line with their remuneration fig-
ures, the Cagrotec’s PAT figures are not. Their board remuneration is steadily grow-
ing whereas the organizational profits are decreasing year by year. In the light of 
this information it is not farfetched to propose that Cargotec’s board remuneration 
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is dependent on the challenges in the organizational environment whereas the 
Konecranes’ board remuneration is dependent on firm performance. 
 
Figure 7 Case companies’ PAT figures compared to total sales revenues. 
Even though both of the case companies have lots of experience in their boards of 
directors, Konecranes has a bit more (12.5 % or 4.25 years) based on the results. 
The difference between the companies is rather large and visible but based on the 
difference between two means it cannot be interpreted as significant. If the per-
centage (value got from comparing the two means) is not 10 % (0.1) or under, there 
is less than 90 % level of confidence to say that the results are significant. This, how-
ever does not mean that the already made assumptions or conclusions would be ir-
relevant or inadequate. The results of the current research are valid for the specific 
sample, even if they would be inconsistent or not “significant”. 
As it was presented earlier, the amount of experience does not automatically in-
crease the amount of external linkages of the boards. However, the growth curves 
for both board experience and boards external linkages resemble each other. They 
are slightly growing over the examination period which suggests that they are 
somehow connected. The author suggests that the amount of board experience 
might have a positive effect to the amount of external linkages. However the board 
experience is not the dominant factor which affects the amount of external link-
ages. Because it is not the dominant factor it is possible for board of directors to 
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have more external linkages than its counterpart while having less experience, as it 
turned out in the case of Cargotec. The experience is a part of board capital which in 
turn is positively associated with the provision of resources.  
The remuneration is harder to link to the board experience because the case com-
panies seem to have quite different remuneration strategies. Cargotec’s remunera-
tion appears to follow the same steady growth as their board experience. At the 
same time Cargotec’s profits (firm performance) are decreasing. In the case of Car-
gotec they seem to acquire more experience to their board of directors in order to 
respond to the changes in the organizational environment and inside the industry. 
Because of the challenging environment the workload for the board increases and 
so does the board’s remuneration. Konecranes’ situation deviates from Cargotec’s 
situation in the parts of firm performance and the board remuneration. The board 
remuneration of Konecranes follows the pattern of firm performance quite well. 
Based on that in formation the author suggests that the remuneration of the board 
of Konecranes is dependent on the firm performance but as the performance fluc-
tuates they find it important to increase the board’s experience. With this action 
the company relies on veteran businessmen and -women’s expertise and practical 
knowledge. 
Table 8 The correlations between the case companies’ qualifications, experience 
and external linkages. 
 
 Qualifications Experience External linkages 
Qualifications 1 0.254 0.285 
Experience  1 -0.56 
External linkages   1 
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The Table 8 above shows the correlations between the different factors of the case 
companies. The correlations are ranked into four groups based on how strong the 
correlation is: none or very weak (0-0.1), weak (0.1-0.3), moderate (0.3-0.5) and 
strong (0.5-1.0). The numerical value 1 means that the correlation between the fac-
tors is strong. In this case they represent the same factors e.g. experience compared 
to experience, thus we can ignore those values. With this introduction it can be said 
that all the other factors have weak correlation excluding the experience and the 
external linkages (-0.56), which have strong negative correlation. Strong negative 
correlation between the experience and the external linkages indicates that the less 
experience the more external linkages. This is in line with the author’s descriptive 
statistics. 
Based on the case companies’ degrees of board dependence and the findings of this 
chapter the author proposes that in this specific case the boards have enough in-
centives to monitor and enough experience and qualifications to provide resources 
in order for the companies to succeed. However the trend seems to be that, even 
though the total sales revenues are fairly stable, the profits are shrinking. The indus-
try they both operate in is producing heavy machinery and services which require 
large investments from the customers. In the time of recovering from the economic 
recession (2011-2013) organizations are cautious with their investments. The case 
companies have increased their board experience, external linkages and incentives 
but are yet to receive positive results from it. It may be that the surrounding envi-
ronment is the biggest link to the firm performance.    
6 DISCUSSION 
The current study on boards of directors started by stating that Hillman and Dal-
ziel’s (2003) integration of the agency and the resource dependence perspectives 
and introduction of the term board capital have been the main motivation and re-
source in the construction of this thesis. At first the RDT was in the center of atten-
tion until the author realized that how deeply the two functions (agency theory and 
RDT) are interconnected. These two functions have clear main paths inside them 
which are utilized in this research as well: the monitoring function (agency theory) 
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and the provision of resources function (RDT). The two functions are introduced in 
the literature review chapter. What these functions have in common is that they 
both have been linked with firm performance by their respective scholars (e.g. 
Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Singh, House & 
Tucker, 1986).  
The ultimate goal was to get a holistic understanding of how the board incentives 
moderate the monitoring function and the provision of resources function and how 
does the board capital affect these connections. The results are somewhat in line 
with the objectives set for the research. The descriptive statistics show that the dif-
ferent factors (experience, qualifications, external linkages and remuneration) quali-
fied for the research have differences and similarities from which the author could 
derive results that answer to the research questions.   
The boards of directors of Cargotec and Konecranes resemble each other very much 
by their composition, abilities and resources. However they seem to have different 
strategies of achieving positive firm performance. Cargotec seems to respond to de-
creasing performance and challenging business environment by increasing the 
board incentives and experience in hope for a good return on investment. 
Konecranes on the other hand has tied the board incentives into firm performance 
and by this, giving the board a motivation and positive pressure to succeed. The 
conclusion made from the results are valid and true for the specific sample in a spe-
cific time frame. From the conclusions it is possible to compose a sound picture 
from the case companies’ boards of directors and their linkage to firm performance.   
Even though the results were satisfying they are only applicable to this research on 
boards of directors. Any generalizations would be good guesses at best. Therefore 
the current study itself leaves some room for further research. With sample size be-
ing only two, it would be relevant to include e.g. history of employment and longer 
observation period than three years. While there is still further research to be done 
from the current study, there are other possibilities as well. In order to have a gen-
eral view of e.g. the boards of directors of the Finnish listed companies and their 
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linkages to firm performance, it would demand a bigger and more carefully selected 
sample and a more specified use of theories. After all, the boards of directors of the 
Finnish listed companies are not thoroughly examined. For a master’s level research 
this would be a sound and challenging topic to conduct.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 PwC’s comparative summary of proposals by NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ. 
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